RAC: A Program in Distress by Squire, Mary
BYU Law Review
Volume 2015 | Issue 1 Article 8
February 2015
RAC: A Program in Distress
Mary Squire
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Health Policy Commons, Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and the Medicine and
Health Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mary Squire, RAC: A Program in Distress, 2015 BYU L. Rev. 219 (2015).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2015/iss1/8
SQUIRE.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015 2:12 PM 
 
219 
RAC: A Program in Distress 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Recovery Audit Program began in an effort to cut improper 
spending within Medicare. Medical providers, which could consist 
of, among other things, hospitals, nursing facilities, and individual 
medical practitioners, bill Medicare for services rendered from the 
provider to Medicare eligible patients. Sometimes the amounts billed 
to Medicare do not accurately reflect the true amount owed to the 
provider, either because the provider “billed & received” an amount 
too high (an overpayment), or an amount too low (an 
underpayment). The Recovery Audit Program was implemented to 
identify and correct any overpayments and underpayments, to ensure 
the actual amount owed and paid to the provider would be accurate. 
The program, administered by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (“CMS”), accepted bids from entities to service 
specific regions of the country. The recipients of those contracts, 
known as Recovery Audit Contractors, were given authorization to 
audit healthcare providers within the designated region for 
inaccurate Medicare payments. 
An audit by a Recovery Audit Contractor (“RAC”)1 has become 
a dreaded event in the business of a healthcare provider. RAC audits 
are notorious for their depth and breadth and the ensuing havoc 
they can cause in the business of caring for Medicare patients. One 
healthcare attorney even referred to the RAC audit as the “torture 
RAC.”2 But beyond the business burden that these audits can create, 
there lies a distinct possibility of constitutional violations by the 
government. The current structure of the RAC audit system has 
already reached near-meltdown status, but so far, CMS has not made 
modifications that come close to solving the enormous problems the 
program is facing. By continuing with the present structure, CMS 
risks violating the due process rights of providers. 
 
 1. While it is standard for a three-letter acronym to be read letter by letter, in practice, 
RAC is read to sound like the word “rack.” 
 2. B. Scott McBride, The Torture RAC, ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL (Mar. 12, 
2009), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3ceb5ad7-9639-4181-bc30-
4049ba343916. 
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The purpose of this Comment is to explore, in depth, the 
possible constitutional violations and fatal flaws of the RAC 
program as it exists today. Part II. conveys the history, procedure, 
and implementation of the RAC audit program, from its 
demonstration period through the permanent rollout. Part III. 
details provider reactions to different aspects of the program, 
including examples of the action they have taken in response. Part 
IV. discusses the current condition of the audits and appeals 
process, and some of the small steps CMS has taken to remedy the 
present problems. Part V. explores the possible due process 
violations that have been created within the system as it stands 
today. Additionally, Part V. considers potential roadblocks within 
many of the steps that providers may take to try to mitigate due 
process concerns. Part VI. suggests a number of possible 
improvements CMS could make to the Recovery Audit Program to 
bring it out of the current stalemate. Part VII. concludes. 
II. HISTORY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOVERY AUDIT 
CONTRACTORS 
A. RAC Demonstration 
Recovery Audit Contractors were first employed during a three-
year “demonstration,” or trial period, by the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (“MMA”).3 
RACs were to operate within the Medicare Integrity Program,4 
which serves as Medicare’s “primary program for safeguarding the 
Medicare Trust Funds against fraud, waste and abuse.”5 Under 
section 306 of the MMA, Congress implemented the RAC program 
to detect and rectify underpayments and overpayments from 
Medicare to healthcare providers, thus furthering the program’s goal 
of combating waste of Medicare dollars.6 The demonstration was to 
discover whether the costs associated with paying a third party on a 
contingency basis would be an economical method of retrieving 
 
 3. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. 
L. No. 108–173, § 306, 117 Stat. 2065, 2256–7 (2003). 
 4. Id. § 306(a), (b); 42 U.S.C. § 1395. 
 5. Medicare Integrity Program, EXPECTMORE.GOV (2002), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/expectmore/summary/10000470.2002.html (last visited Oct. 
22, 2014). 
 6. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act § 306(a). 
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overpayments.7 The program originated in the states that had the 
highest Medicare utilization per capita,8 determined to be Florida, 
New York, and California, later expanding to South Carolina, 
Arizona, and Massachusetts.9 
In the event of a discovered overpayment to a provider and 
absent an appeal, the default action by the Medicare Administrative 
Contractor, the entity charged with dispersing Medicare funds, was 
to initiate recoupment for recovery of the funds.10 Recoupment is 
the process by which Medicare payments to a provider are withheld 
on new claims to make up for an overpayment to that provider.11 By 
withholding payments until the debt was satisfied, CMS could 
ensure return of funds that were determined to be improper.12 
1. Audit methods 
RAC audits were performed using two methods: automated 
review and complex review. Automated review was done through 
software analysis of claims submitted to Medicare.13 Automated 
review identified clearly erroneous inaccuracies in billing, like 
duplicate billings and coding errors.14 Once identified, a demand for 
repayment was sent to the provider without any further evaluation of 
the claim.15 Complex review required physical review of the medical 
record.16 After recognizing that there could be an overpayment issue, 
 
 7. Id. § 306(f). 
 8. Id. § 306(b)(1)(A). 
 9. Abby Pendleton & Jessica L. Gustafson, The Future of the Recovery Audit Contractor 
Program, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (Aug. 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/ 
publications/aba_health_esource_home/aba_health_law_esource_1108_pendleton.html. 
 10. The Medicare Overpayment Collection Process, CMS.GOV, 2 (May, 2014), 
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-
MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/OverpaymentBrochure508-09.pdf. 
 11. Id. at 3. 
 12. Id. 
 13. The Medicare Recovery Audit Contractor (RAC) Program: An Evaluation of the 3-
Year Demonstration, CMS.GOV, 12 (June 2008), http://www.cms.gov/Recovery-Audit-
Program/Downloads/RACEvaluationReport.pdf [hereinafter Evaluation of 3-
Year Demonstration]. 
 14. The Medicare Fee-For-Service Recovery Audit Program Process, CMS.GOV, (JAN. 
2013), www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-
MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/Medicare-Fee-For-Service-Recovery-Audit-Program-
Process-Educational-Tool-ICN908524.pdf ; Evaluation of 3-Year Demonstration, supra note 
10, at 12. 
 15. The Medicare Fee-For-Service Recovery Audit Program Practice, supra note 14, at 2. 
 16. Id. 
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the RAC would request the medical record from the provider.17 This 
request was called an Additional Document Request (“ADR”).18 If 
that physical review of the record revealed an overpayment, a 
demand letter was sent.19 Both automated and complex reviews 
could be conducted on claims as far back as four years from the date 
of the audit.20 
2. Discussion period 
If a review found an overpayment, a letter requesting repayment 
was sent to the provider.21 The initial phase after a demand letter was 
sent by the RAC to a provider could also become a “discussion 
period.”22 If desired, the provider could contact the RAC outside of 
the formal appeal process to discuss the claim denials.23 The provider 
could also offer documentation to the RAC that could have the 
potential to change the outcome of the denial.24 The RAC had the 
option of reversing a determination during the discussion period.25 
Initiating a discussion did not begin the appeals process; the two 
were separate avenues.26 This period could last up to forty days after 
receipt of the demand letter.27 
3. Appeals process 
If the provider had a dispute over any of the funds flagged by the 
RAC as overpayments, she was entitled to utilize the established 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Medicare Program Integrity Manual, CMS.GOV, ch. 3.2.3A, (2014), 
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/pim83c03.pdf. 
 19. Joanne B. Erde, Recovery Audit Contractors: Is the Honeymoon Over?, 
DUANEMORRIS.COM (Feb. 2006), 
www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/modern_healthcare_feb06.pdf. 
 20. Recovery Audit Contractors, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS’N, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-managing-your-practice/coding-billing-
insurance/medicare/recovery-audit-contractors.page (last visited Apr. 29, 2014). 
 21. The Medicare Fee-For-Service Recovery Audit Program Process, supra note 14. 
 22. Frequently Asked Questions, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
https://questions.cms.gov/faq.php?id=5005&faqId=2731 (last visited Apr. 29, 2014). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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Medicare appeals process.28 The first level of appeal involved a 
redetermination of the claim.29 The provider had to file for a 
redetermination within 120 days of receiving the decision from the 
RAC.30 This initial appeal was reviewed by staff of the RAC that had 
not been involved in the original determination of overpayment.31 If 
the appeal did not end in favor of the provider, she had the 
opportunity to continue the appeal. The second appeal level was a 
reconsideration of the claim by a Qualified Independent Contractor 
(“QIC”).32 A QIC was a contractor unaffiliated with the RAC and 
assigned by region.33 The provider had 180 days after receipt of the 
redetermination to file for the reconsideration.34 As a third party, the 
QIC would not have been involved with the redetermination, and 
would approach the claim with fresh eyes.35 
If the provider was still not happy with the outcome, she would 
continue to the third level of appeal—a hearing before an 
administrative law judge (“ALJ”).36 The request for an ALJ hearing 
had to be made within sixty days of the QIC decision.37 In addition 
to the escalated formality of a hearing, this level of appeal required a 
minimum amount to remain in controversy.38The fourth level of 
appeal within Medicare was the Medicare Appeals Council (“Appeals 
Council”); an appeal to the Appeals Council must be made within 
 
 28. Medicare Appeals Process, CMS.GOV (Aug. 2014), http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-
and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network- 
MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/MedicareAppealsProcess.pdf. 
 29. Id. at 2–3. 
 30. Id. at 3. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 4. 
 33. Original Medicare Appeals - Level 2: Reconsideration by a Qualified Independent 
Contractor (QIC), MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/claims-and-appeals/file-an-
appeal/original-medicare/original-medicare-appeals-level-2.html; Second Level of Appeal: 
Reconsideration by a Qualified Independent Contractor, CMS.GOV (May 9, 2014) 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Appeals-and-
Grievances/OrgMedFFSAppeals/ReconsiderationbyaQualifiedIndependentContractor.html. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 28, at 5–6. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. In 2015, if the disputed amount is above $150, an appeal can be heard by an 
ALJ. Third Level of Appeal: Hearing by an Administrative Law Judge, CMS.GOV (Feb. 25, 
2015, 1:10 PM),http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Appeals-and 
Grievances/OrgMedFFSAppeals/HearingsALJ.html. 
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sixty days of the ALJ decision.39 The Appeals Council was the final 
step within CMS, but not the final level of appeal.40 If the provider 
was still dissatisfied with the result of the Appeals Council hearing, it 
may escalate the matter for judicial review in a federal district court.41 
For a claim to progress to this point, it must meet the minimum 
amount in controversy and the appeal must be filed fewer than sixty 
days after the Appeals Council decision.42 
In addition to the timeline that dictated when providers must 
file, all stages of appeal had respective statutory timeliness 
requirements placed on each phase of review.43 At any level, if the 
decision maker did not act within the prescribed timeframe, the 
provider could escalate the appeal to the next level.44 The first and 
second levels must be decided by the RAC and the QIC, respectively, 
within sixty days of filing.45 The ALJ and the Appeals Council both 
had ninety days to issue a decision before the provider could skip 
that level and move upward.46 
4. Fees to contractors 
Under the MMA, Recovery Audit Contractors were paid a 
contingency fee for the payment errors they discovered during 
the demonstration.47 Although initially applied only to 
overpayments to providers, the fee was eventually paid to the 
RAC whether it discovered an overpayment or an 
underpayment.48 If an appeal was made, the RAC was allowed to 
 
 39. Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 28, at 7. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 7–8. 
 42. Id. at 8. This number can change yearly. For the year 2015, the amount is $1,460.) 
Fifth Level of Appeal: Judicial Review in Federal District Court, CMS.GOV (Oct. 5, 2014, 1:29 
PM), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Appeals-and-Grievances/OrgMedFFSAppeals/Review-
Federal-District-Court.html; see also Original Medicare (Fee-for-service) Appeals, CMS.GOV 
(June 24, 2015, 1:25 PM), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/appeals-and-
Grievances/OrgMedFFSAppeals/index.html. 
 43. Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 28. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 2–3. 
 46. Id. at 4. 
 47. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act § 306(a)(1). 
 48. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-143, MEDICARE RECOVERY 
AUDIT CONTRACTING: WEAKNESSES REMAIN IN ADDRESSING VULNERABILITIES TO 
IMPROPER PAYMENTS ALTHOUGH IMPROVEMENTS MADE TO CONTRACTOR OVERSIGHT, 
(2010) at 3, n.12 [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
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keep the fee if the determination survived the first level of 
appeal.49 However, if the RAC’s decision was overturned at that 
stage, the fee was returned to CMS.50 If the provider appealed 
beyond the first level and had the denial overturned at some 
later point, the RAC was allowed to keep the fee.51 
5. Recoupment 
Once an overpayment to a provider was identified by the RAC, 
CMS was quick to recover the funds. Initially, a demand letter 
would be sent to the provider, notifying it of the amount of the 
overpayment.52 If the funds were not repaid after forty days, 
Medicare would begin recoupment.53 If funds were recouped, all 
future payments to the provider were halted until the amount owed 
back to Medicare was satisfied.54 
In order for a provider to delay recoupment pending an appeal, 
the provider had to file for redetermination within thirty days of 
receiving the demand letter.55 This timetable was not consistent with 
the allowable time to file only for the redetermination, which was 
quite a bit longer at 120 days.56 If the provider was later than thirty 
days in filing, and recoupment had commenced before the request 
was received, none of the funds recouped were returned to the 
provider, unless the claims were overturned later on appeal.57 
The recoupment process was similar at the second level of 
appeal. The provider was allowed 180 days to appeal a 
redetermination, but in order to again delay the recoupment process, 
the request for reconsideration by a QIC must be made within sixty 
days of the redetermination decision.58 Once this second appeal level 
was exhausted, recoupment was inevitable if the decision was still 
 
 49. Id. at 31. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. The Medicare Overpayment Collection Process, CMS.GOV, 2, (May 2014), 
http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-
MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/overpaymentbrochure508-09.pdf. 
 53. Id. at 5. 
 54. Id. at 3. 
 55. Id. at 4. 
 56. Id. at 6. 
 57. Id. at 4. 
 58. Id. at 3–4. 
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adverse to the provider, regardless of the provider’s decision to 
appeal further.59 
6. Program evaluation 
The RAC demonstration lasted for a period of three years, and at 
the end of that time, the results were reviewed by CMS.60 The 
program had collected over $1 billion in improper payments61 and 
paid out over $187 million in contingency fees.62 This meant that the 
cost of recovering overpayments was a mere twenty cents for every 
dollar recouped.63 The demonstration period’s goal was to examine 
whether it was financially beneficial to hire contractors to recover 
Medicare funds billed in error, and it would appear from the report 
that the answer was a resounding yes.64 Although there were 
problems acknowledged in the report,65 after such a glowing 
performance, the RAC audit was on its way to 
permanent application.66 
Additionally, a portion of the report was devoted to the reaction 
and impact of the RAC demonstration on providers.67 The 
government results indicated that a large majority of providers felt 
the process was “fair and reasonable.”68 Furthermore, the analysis of 
the percentage of dollars recouped compared to providers’ overall 
revenue from Medicare revealed that the financial burden for the 
providers was small.69 
7. Initial provider response to the demonstration 
Despite the results of CMS’ final report on the RAC 
demonstration to the contrary, providers were not happy with the 
 
 59. Id. at 4. 
 60. Evaluation of 3-Year Demonstration, supra note 13. 
 61. Id. at 15. 
 62. Id. at 14. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 29. 
 65. Id. at 24–27. Changes were made to the program based on the issues discovered in 
the demonstration. Those changes are discussed in the next section on permanent 
RAC implementation. 
 66. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 120 Stat. 2922, 
2991–92 (2006). 
 67. Evaluation of 3-Year Demonstration, supra note 13, at 20–21. 
 68. Id. at 2. 
 69. Id. at 20. 
SQUIRE.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:12 PM 
219 RAC: A Program in Distress 
 227 
program.70 Every dollar that was repaid to the government was taken 
away from a provider, and not all providers felt the process was 
sound or the results were valid.71 The proportion of overpayments as 
opposed to underpayments identified highlighted the RAC’s focus 
on overpayments.72 When the program was implemented, detecting 
improper payments was identified as an objective of the program; 
improper payments included both overpayments and 
underpayments.73 During the demonstration period, only about four 
percent of the errors identified were underpayments to providers.74 A 
RAC was able to keep any fee it collected, so long as the claim 
determination survived the first level of appeal, which was performed 
by staff of the RAC itself.75 
B. Nationwide RAC Program Implementation 
The national RAC program was permanently implemented with 
the passage of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006.76 Section 
302 of the Act specifically addressed implementation, requiring the 
RAC program to be rolled out in every state by 2010.77 
1. Initial updates to the RAC program 
There were several notable differences, including the following, 
when CMS expanded the audits nationwide:78 
a. Three year “look-back” period. A look-back period is the 
amount of time in the past that the auditor may review a provider’s 
claims.79 The Act limited look-backs to three years, although no 
claims could be reviewed that were dated prior to October 2007, 
regardless of the date the program was implemented in the state 
 
 70. McBride, supra note 2. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Evaluation of 3-Year Demonstration, supra note 13, at 15. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 20. 
 76. Tax Relief and Healthcare Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 302, 120 Stat. 
2922, 2991–92 (2006). 
 77. Id. 
 78. McBride, supra note 2; CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, 
STATEMENT OF WORK FOR THE RECOVERY AUDIT CONTRACTOR PROGRAM, (2007), 
available at https://www.fbo.gov/utils/view?id=f8f1d845d960c3229301aeec334c7eb4 
[hereinafter CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES]. 
 79. Recovery Audit Contractors, supra note 20. 
SQUIRE.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:12 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
228 
where the provider was located.80 The look-back period during the 
demonstration period had been four years.81 
b. Status of RAC employees. During the demonstration period, 
RACs were not required to have either a physician medical 
director or a certified coder reviewing claims.82 The permanent 
program required both.83 
c. Limits on medical record requests. The new program limited the 
number of requests for medical records that a RAC could make on a 
provider within a forty-five-day period, varying by the size of 
provider.84 There was not only a maximum number of ADRs that 
could be made, but also a minimum, meaning the audit had to 
uncover a threshold amount before the provider could be requested 
to provide the medical records.85 There had been no statutory limits 
during the demonstration, although each RAC had the option to 
implement limits if it chose to.86 
d. Repayment of contingency fee. The RAC was only required to 
repay the contingency fee during the demonstration period if its 
determination was overturned at the first level of appeal.87 In the 
nationwide program, the contractor must refund the fee if the 
determination is overturned, regardless of the appeal level.88 
2. Contingency fee rates 
Since the program has rolled out nationwide, CMS has disclosed 
the contingency fees paid to the contractors.89 There are now four 
RAC servicers, each assigned to a regional cluster of states.90 Each 
 
 80. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, supra note 78, at 8. 
 81. Recovery Audit Contractors, supra note 20. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE 
RECOVERY AUDIT PROGRAM ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION LIMITS FOR MEDICARE 
PROVIDERS 2 (2013), available at http://cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Recovery-Audit-Program/Downloads/April-2013-Provider-
ADR-Limit-Update.pdf. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 13. 
 90. Id. 
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contractor negotiates its own fee, ranging from 9% to 12.5% of 
improper payments identified by the RAC.91 
III. PROVIDER RESPONSE 
A. Provider Issues 
Medicare providers and provider advocacy groups have 
continued to be unhappy with the RAC program.92 Provider groups 
have advocated for reform on several fronts, and have lodged 
numerous complaints about the process of the audits, the burden on 
providers, and the costs associated with facilitating a RAC audit.93 
1. Contingency fee 
Of the many complaints providers have had with the RAC 
program, none has been so unified and pronounced as their 
collective opposition to a contingency fee-based system for 
overpayment discovery. The contingency fees paid to RACs have 
been termed “bounty hunter-style” within the healthcare industry, 
and the term is freely used by reputable organizations like the 
American Medical Association94 and the American Hospital 
Association (“AHA”),95 as well as healthcare attorneys,96 among 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Letter from Richard Umbdenstock, President and CEO of the American Hosp. 
Ass’n, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. (April 17, 
2013), available at http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2013/130417-let-hhs-
umbdenstock.pdf (noting recent changes to rectify unfair rebilling practices did not go far 
enough to adequately address the problem); Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President of 
the American Hosp. Ass’n, to Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r for Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs. (January 14, 2014), available at http://www.aha.org/advocacy-
issues/letter/2014/140114-let-aljdelays.pdf (stating that current delays for ALJ hearings are 
not consistent with statutory timelines, excessive denials by RACs are adding to the 
backlog problem). 
 93. See Recovery Audit Contractors, supra, note 20; AHA RAC Trac Initiative, 
AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/rac/ractrac.shtml 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2014). 
 94. AM. MED. ASS’N, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION FACT SHEET, MEDICARE 
RECOVERY AUDIT CONTRACTOR (RAC) PROGRAM APPEALS, available at 
https://resourcesforrisk.com/_default/download/download_free_doc.php?file=Recovery+Au
dit+Contractors+Fact+Sheet.pdf [hereinafter AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION]. 
 95. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, FACTS ABOUT THE MEDICARE AUDIT 
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2013 2  (2014), available at www.aha.org/content/13/fs-
hr1250rac.pdf [hereinafter AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION]. 
 96. McBride, supra note 2. 
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others.97 It seems clear that if the entity responsible for the audit 
stands to profit directly from every claim it denies, there is a perverse 
incentive for it to reject claims that might otherwise be deemed 
legitimate.98 This concern is furthered by the finding by CMS’s 
Office of Inspector General that RACs deny half of the claims that 
they review upon redetermination.99 
2. Status of auditors 
Providers were also critical of the medical expertise of the 
auditors.100 Doctors interact with the patients and make decisions 
for treatments based on their knowledge of and experience with 
their diagnosis.101 The RAC was staffed with auditors who are 
usually either nurses or therapists.102 Providers strongly believed 
that a physician who was physically present with the patient when 
the treatments were chosen should not be second-guessed by less-
qualified medical professionals months, and possibly years, after 
the fact.103 
3. Look-back vs. rebilling 
After permanent implementation, a RAC could investigate 
payment claims made up to three years prior to the review.104 Many 
of the RAC claim denials were made to hospitals regarding 
inpatient care, with the RAC deeming the treatment medically 
unnecessary.105 In reality, the medical necessity often existed, but 
the treatment was provided in an inpatient setting instead of 
outpatient. These claims would have been allowable as outpatient 
care, because it was more cost effective than inpatient care.106 
 
 97. A Google search for “Medicare RAC ‘bounty hunters’” returns over 17,000 results. 
 98. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 94. 
 99. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
MEDICARE RECOVERY AUDIT CONTRACTORS AND CMS’S ACTIONS TO ADDRESS IMPROPER 
PAYMENTS, REFERRALS OF POTENTIAL FRAUD, AND PERFORMANCE 17 (2013), available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-11-00680.pdf [hereinafter OIG REPORT]. 
 100. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 95, at 3. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES supra note 78. 
 105. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 95, at 4. 
 106. Id. 
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Hospitals were only allowed to rebill these claims within one year, 
and were therefore often not able to recover any of the funds that 
would be due on an inpatient-turned-outpatient claim because of 
the time lapse.107 The American Hospital Association advanced that 
this disparity between the time periods for look-back and allowable 
rebilling “violate[ed] CMS’s statutory requirement to pay for all 
reasonable and necessary care,” in addition to costing the providers 
millions of dollars.108 The AHA advocated for a one-year look-back 
period, keeping the time frame for rebilling consistent with the 
audit window.109 
4. Rate of denials overturned 
Providers who label the RACs “bounty hunters” were validated 
by two statistics: the percentage of cases “red-flagged” for complex 
review that actually contain error and the percentage of denials that 
are overturned on appeal.110 The AHA asserted that, of all claims 
audited by complex review, fifty-eight percent contained no billing 
errors.111 These were the claims initially flagged by software as having 
some indicator for a billing error and then physically reviewed by an 
auditor.112 Providers contended that the methods used by the RACs 
were not accurately indicating errors in well over half of the cases.113 
Among the remaining claims denied by a RAC, nearly half of those 
are appealed.114 Once appealed, providers claimed that seventy-two 
percent of denied claims are overturned by the ALJ.115 Providers 
argued that the high rate of denials proved that RACs were 
motivated more by the possible contingency fee than the validity of 
the claim denial.116 
The Office of Inspector General’s (“OIG”) numbers told a 
different story.117 In August 2013, the OIG released a report on 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, Facts, supra note 95, at 4. 
 112. The Medicare Fee-For-Service Recovery Audit Program Process, supra note 14, at 2. 
 113. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 95, at 3. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 2. 
 116. Id. 
 117. OIG REPORT, supra note 99.  
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RACs and included its own conclusion of their efficiency in 
determining payment errors within Medicare.118 In that report, the 
OIG found that only six percent of overpayment claims were 
appealed, and forty-four percent of those denials were overturned.119 
No explanation has been given for the enormous disparity in data 
between the sources. 
5. Financial burden on providers 
The AHA continually surveys hospitals that are subject to RAC 
audits and monitors the costs associated with the process.120 Of the 
hospitals responding, nearly half had spent at least $100,000 in a 
year’s time on costs related to RACs.121 Twelve percent of hospitals 
spent over $400,000 each in the same amount of time.122 These 
costs could be justified in the interest of protection and preservation 
of the Medicare Trust Fund, but considering the rate at which 
providers claim their appeals are granted, the expenses seem 
burdensome to providers who find a high rate of success on appeal. 
B. Provider Action 
1. RACTrac 
Healthcare providers felt they received a dearth of information 
from CMS regarding the RAC program.123 Hospitals especially felt 
the pinch from the audits,124 as RACs were able to target large 
numbers of high value claims at once through automated review. 
Denial of inpatient payments was especially common, and the fees 
the contractor would receive from denial of those claims would have 
added up quickly.125 
 
 118. Id. at 11 
 119. Id. 
 120. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note95, at 4. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 95, at 4. 
 124. OIG REPORT, supra note 99, at 11. 
 125. Jennifer Bresnick, AHA Survey: Medicare RAC Audits Up 47% Since Last Year, 
EHR INTELLIGENCE (Sept. 3, 2013), http://ehrintelligence.com/2013/09/03/aha-survey-
medicare-rac-audits-up-47-since-last-year/. 
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Since hospitals were the biggest target of RACs,126 the AHA 
sprang into action and created a program called RACTrac, which 
monitors RAC activity and appeals as well as the impact of the 
audits on providers.127 RACTrac collects, compiles, and publishes 
information on RAC audits from hospitals.128 The initial reports 
began in the first quarter of 2010 and have continued quarterly 
ever since.129 
The statistics reported by RACTrac often differ from information 
released by CMS regarding the RAC program.130 There has not been 
an adequate explanation for the large discrepancies. RACTrac is a 
voluntary program provided by the AHA, although hospitals are 
incentivized to participate as a way to showcase the problems with 
the RAC system.131 Less than full participation could explain some 
discrepancy, but the differences are not insignificant. The real reason 
for the disparities remains to be found. 
2. AHA lawsuits 
In late 2012, the American Hospital Association and several 
hospitals filed suit against Kathleen Sebelius in her capacity as 
Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia over the inability 
of hospitals to rebill under the appropriate designation after initial 
inpatient claims were denied, discussed previously.132 The AHA 
claimed that CMS’s stated policy to refuse rebilling was arbitrary 
and capricious, and violated federal law because it did not go 
through the necessary notice and comment procedure statutorily 
required for rulemaking.133 
In March of 2013 and presumably in response to this lawsuit, 
CMS issued a new order allowing for some rebilling to occur.134 The 
AHA then amended its initial claim, claiming that the new remedies 
 
 126. OIG REPORT, supra note 99, at 11. 
 127. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 95. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Compare OIG REPORT, supra note 99, with AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, 
supra note 95. 
 131. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 95. 
 132. Complaint, AHA v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-1770 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 133. Id. at 4. 
 134. CMS Ruling No: CMS-1455-R, 78 Fed. Reg. 16632 (2013). 
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were inadequate and unlawful.135 The lawsuit was dismissed in 
September, 2014 on jurisdictional grounds.136 
A mandamus complaint was filed by the AHA and three 
medical centers that have amounts ranging from about $600,000 
to $7.6 million tied up in the Medicare appeals process.137 The 
complaint indicates that the hospitals are being harmed by the 
immense amounts of cash unavailable to them because of the 
Medicare appeals backlog.138 
3. Additional support for providers 
Providers are not alone in their disapproval of the RAC program. 
In February 2014, 111 members of Congress petitioned Secretary 
Sebelius to take immediate action to reform the RAC program and 
resolve the oppressing delays providers face.139 The legislators took 
issue with many of the same problems that providers voiced concern 
over, including payment of contractors by contingency fee, the 
length of the look-back period, the administrative burden on 
providers, and the high rate of denials overturned on appeal.140 
IV. CURRENT STATE OF RAC APPEALS AND AUDITS 
A. Appeals 
The Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (“OMHA”) 
governs the ALJ hearings in the CMS appeals process.141 In 
December 2013, OMHA issued a memorandum to all Medicare 
appellants.142 Nancy Griswold, the Chief ALJ for OMHA, notified 
the appellants that in July 2013 OMHA had “temporarily 
 
 135. Second Amended Complaint, AHA v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-1770, 5 
(D.D.C. 2013). 
 136. AHA v. Burwell, No. 12-1770, (D.D.C. 2014). 
 137. Complaint, AHA v. Sebelius, No. 14-cv-851, 5–6 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 138. Id. at 16–19. 
 139. Letter from Members of Congress to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of 
Health and Human Servs. (February 10, 2014), available at 
http://www.aha.org/content/14/140210-let-congress-hhs.pdf. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (OMHA), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUM. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/omha/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2014). 
 142. Memorandum to OMHA Medicare Appellants, (Dec. 24, 2013) available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/omha/OMHA%20Medicare%20Appellant%20Forum/letter_to_medicar
e_appellants_from_the_calj.pdf. 
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suspended” assigning appeals to ALJs. OMHA employs sixty-five 
ALJs, who were at that time overloaded with appeals,143 with over 
350,000 claims pending.144 While the number of appeals had grown 
shy of 200% from 2010 to 2013, the budget to adjudicate these 
claims remained the same.145 
In early 2014, OMHA added information about the backlog to 
its website.146 It would now take five to six months for new hearing 
requests to be “docket[ed],” and up to twenty-eight months for the 
appeal to even be assigned to an ALJ.147 OMHA also stated that 
appellants have a right to escalate their cases if cases are not 
adjudicated within the statutory timeframe of ninety days.148 The 
website includes instructions on escalation, along with a reminder 
that the Appeals Council, the next level of review, has no hearing 
requirement, meaning the in-person appeal most providers were 
waiting for might not be provided. The Appeals Council, in 
accordance with 42 C.F.R. §405.1108(d),149 may: 
1) Issue a decision based on the record constructed at the 
QIC and any additional evidence, including oral 
testimony, entered in the record by the ALJ before the 
case was escalated. 
2) Conduct any additional proceedings, including a hearing 
that the Appeals Council determines are necessary to 
issue a decision. 
3) Remand the case to an ALJ for further proceedings, 
including a hearing. 
4) Dismiss the request for Appeals Council review because 
the appellant does not have the right to escalate 
the appeal. 
5) Dismiss the request for a hearing for any reason that the 
ALJ could have dismissed the request.150 
 
 143. Id. at 1 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Adjudication Timeframes, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/omha/important_ 
notice_regarding_adjudication_timeframes.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2014). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1108 (2011). 
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In February 2014, OMHA held a forum for providers 
concerning the current backlog of appeals.151 According to the 
presentation, there are currently 480,000 appeals that are awaiting 
assignment to an ALJ.152 Although some minor advice was given to 
providers by OMHA representatives to speed up the appeals process, 
there were no major initiatives announced at the forum.153 
B. A Pause in Audits 
Two days after the February 2014 OMHA provider forum, CMS 
announced a “pause” in RAC activity.154 Current contracts with 
RACs would be expiring mid-year, and those contractors would need 
to wind down their cases to be finished by the June 1, 2014 
deadline.155 CMS instituted deadlines, after which RACs were not 
able to send out additional ADRs to providers or report improper 
payments to Medicare.156 The pause would “allow CMS to continue 
to refine and improve the Medicare Recovery Audit Program. CMS 
[would] continue to review and refine the process as necessary.”157 
C. Recent Notable Updates and Improvements 
In March of 2013, CMS issued a ruling concerning hospitals’ 
ability to rebill for outpatient services when the claim for inpatient 
services was denied during an audit.158 CMS lifted the one-year 
rebilling limit so hospitals could re-submit claims under outpatient 
billing and get some payment for the services rendered to the 
patient.159 The ruling, however, only covered claims that were still 
 
 151. OMHA Medicare Appellant Forum, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/omha/ 
omha_medicare_appellant_forum.html (last visited May 1, 2014). 
 152. Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals, Medicare Appellant Forum 57 (Feb. 
12, 2014) http://www.hhs.gov/omha/OMHA%20Medicare%20Appellant%20Forum/omha_ 
medicare_appellant_forum_presentations.pdf. 
 153. Donna K. Thiel, OMHA Holds Medicare Appellant Forum, AM. HEALTH LAWYERS 
ASS’N (February 17, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=aa6207aa-eb74-
4ff6-93cc-df5c035944ff. 
 154. Recovery Audit Program Recent Updates, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/ 
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-
Programs/Recovery-Audit-Program/Recent_Updates.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2014). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. CMS Ruling No: CMS-1455-P, 78 Fed. Reg. 16632 (Mar. 13, 2013). 
 159. Id. 
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active, meaning those that were currently being appealed or those 
that were still in the statutory period of eligibility for appeal.160 
While this brought some relief going forward, there was some 
disappointment with the ruling.161 Providers claim they had been 
warned by CMS that appealing on the very basis of the inconsistency 
between lookback and rebilling was futile, and therefore a large 
majority of providers never appealed any inpatient denials.162 There 
was no reason for them to devote the time and money involved in an 
appeal that CMS had assured would fail.163 Large numbers of claims 
that could have been rebilled were therefore lost because the 
hospitals did not have any way to predict this change in policy.164 
In early 2014, CMS announced that there would be some 
relevant changes to the RAC program when the new round of 
contracts began December 30, 2014.165 RACs would only have a six-
month look-back period when evaluating whether hospital inpatient 
status was appropriate.166 This action should solve providers’ 
concerns about their prior inability to rebill these denied claims 
under the correct status. 
Changes included other areas of concern as well. First, the RAC 
was required to wait the duration of the discussion period before it 
sent the claim denial to Medicare.167 Previously, the discussion 
period would discontinue if a provider filed an appeal.168 The 
change would allow providers to engage in a conversation with the 
auditor before the clock started on the appeals process.169 Second, 
CMS altered the timing of the award payment to the RAC.170 The 
former rule required fees to be paid to contractors when the 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Letter from Richard Umbdenstock, President and CEO of the Am. Hosp. Ass’n, to 
Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv. (Apr. 17, 2013), 
http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2013/130417-let-hhs-umbdenstock.pdf. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Recovery Audit Program Improvements, CMS.GOV, 1 (Feb. 18, 2014), 
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/ 
Medicare-FFS-Compliance-Programs/Recovery-Audit-Program/Downloads/RAC-Program-
Improvements.pdf. 
 166.  Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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recoupment occurred, regardless of an appeal.171 The award to the 
RAC would now not be given until the claim, if appealed, finished 
the QIC level.172 
Third, CMS improved the way it calculated ADR limits. 
Although there were more complexities built into the computation, 
the basic analysis looked at the size of the provider and the amount 
of Medicare dollars it received, and based the cap on those 
factors.173 The minimums were standard across the board.174 CMS 
would now factor in the denial rate of the provider into the 
equation, allowing lower ADR limits for those providers who had a 
lower percentage of denials.175 
Fourth, RACs would now face penalties for high rates of 
overturned claim denials and low accuracy on automated reviews.176 
If a contractor met or exceeded a ten percent overturn rate at the 
first level of appeal, it would be subject to corrective action, followed 
by the possibility of exclusion from review of certain types of claims 
or the increase of ADR limits.177 Automated reviews needed to meet 
or exceed ninety-five percent accuracy.178 If they fail, CMS will 
employ a third party to aid the RAC in lowering the error rate.179 
Finally, CMS instituted a Provider Relations Coordinator to act 
as an intermediary between providers and RACs when a concern 
could not be resolved.180 Providers will now have a specific person 
within CMS to contact with RAC issues.181 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Medicare Fee-for-Service Recovery Audit Program Additional Documentation Limits 
for Medicare Providers, CMS.GOV  (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-
Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/recovery-audit-
program/downloads/Providers_ADRLimit_Update-03-12.pdf. 
 174. Medicare Fee-for-Service Recovery Audit Program Additional Documentation Limits 
for Medicare Providers, CMS.GOV, 2 (Apr. 15, 2013), http://cms.gov/Research-Statistics-
Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Recovery-Audit-Program/Downloads/April-2013-
Provider-ADR-Limit-Update.pdf. 
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       176.   Id. at 3. 
       177.   Id. 
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       180.   Id. at 4. 
       181.   Id. 
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In spite of these changes, not all provider concerns were 
addressed.182 Most notably, there was no mention of alleviating the 
massive delays at the ALJ appeal level. 
In March 2014, the Protecting Access to Medicare Act was 
passed.183 Section 111(b) of the Act contains, among other things, a 
provision that freezes the RAC’s ability to review a certain types of 
Medicare claims absent indication of fraud or abuse.184 Review of 
short-stay inpatient claims examined for compliance with the “two-
midnight rule” is prohibited.185 Although this Act inhibits the ability 
of RACs to review this one type of claim, they are still free to 
evaluate any others. 
In July 2014, Nancy Griswold, the Chief ALJ for OMHA, made 
a statement before the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Health Care, 
and Entitlements.186 In that statement she revealed some new 
statistics and additional measures recently employed to begin to ease 
the appeal backlog. Ms. Griswold stated that the supplemental 
funding allowed OMHA to hire additional staff, but still did not 
come close to addressing the over 800,000 pending appeals.187 
Just days before the statement was made, OMHA revealed on its 
website two new methods for appellants to exercise in an effort to 
speed up their appeals at the ALJ level.188 The first was through a 
“statistical sampling initiative.”189 Statistical sampling requires large 
numbers of claims to be submitted, then a random sample taken.190 
 
 182. Letter from Rick Pollack, Executive Vice President of the American Hospital 
Association, to Marilyn Tavenner, Administrator for Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2014/140114-let-aljdelays.pdf. 
 183. Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-93 § 111(b) (Mar. 
31, 2014). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Statement of Nancy J. Griswold, Chief Administrative Law Judge, Office of 
Medicare Hearings and Appeals, on “Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals Workloads,” 
before the United States House Committee on Oversight & Government Reform, 
Subcommittee on Energy Policy (July 10, 2014), http://oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/CMS-Griswold-OMHA-Final.pdf. 
 187. Id. at 4. 
 188. Id. at 5. 
 189. 
Statistical Sampling Initiative, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/omha/omha%20statistical%2
0sampling/statistical_sampling_initiative.html. 
 190. Id. 
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The results from the sample (claim denials overturned vs. affirmed) 
are then projected onto the entire group. The results are reviewed by 
an ALJ to formulate her decision.191 
The second new option available to appellants is a mediation-
based process, called “settlement conference facilitation.”192 A 
facilitator, an OMHA employee, would attempt to find a solution 
that would appeal to both parties.193 The facilitator would not 
participate in any fact-finding, but focus on a solution.194 If a 
solution is reached, both parties sign an agreement and the 
appellant’s appeal concerning the agreed-upon claims is to be 
dismissed.195 
V. VIOLATION OF PROVIDERS’ PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
A. Procedural Due Process 
In practice, the current RAC program has the potential to violate 
a provider’s procedural due process during the appeal proceedings. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments grant due process to all 
citizens.196 The Fifth Amendment states, in part, “No person 
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.”197 By withholding funds necessary to sustain the provider’s 
business, the government is violating the due process provision of 
the Constitution. 
Medical providers are entitled to be engaged in their profession 
without the government limiting that freedom unnecessarily. The 
United State Supreme Court has established that the abilities to be 
employed and earn a living are legitimate liberty interests protected 
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.198 In Meyer v. Nebraska, 
the Court stated: 
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the 
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Settlement Conference Facilitation Pilot, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/ 
omha/settlement_conference_facilitation_pilot.html 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV, § 1. 
 197. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 198. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
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and some of the included things have been definitely stated. 
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily 
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage 
in any of the common occupations of life.199 
Since Meyer was decided, these words have become so firmly part 
of American jurisprudence that this concept has been cited or quoted 
well over a thousand times in subsequent cases.200 
Once a liberty interest has been established, it is important to 
determine that the proceeding necessarily affords the provider due 
process. Although due process is not applicable to agency 
rulemaking, it is applicable to agency adjudications, so long as the 
proceeding has the potential to deprive the provider of liberty or 
property.201 The occupational interest of the provider is at risk in the 
appeals process and Medicare recoupment, and therefore due process 
must be afforded. 
For some providers, recoupment of funds still under appeal from 
a RAC audit could deprive providers of their occupations. In these 
cases, the government is not fulfilling its statutory duty to hear 
appeals in a timely manner. When one level of appeal drags on in 
excess of two years, CMS has adequate time to recover all monies in 
dispute in the appeal without ever holding a hearing. 
The RAC auditors, utilizing computer software,202 have the 
ability to review a large number of Medicare claims in small amounts 
of time. They also have the grant of authority from CMS to look as 
far back as three years into a provider’s Medicare claims.203 These two 
factors enable the auditor to potentially call into question claims 
worth a substantial amount of money. When CMS initiates 
recoupment during the prolonged appeals process, the lack of 
incoming funds can devastate a medical provider. 
If providers serve a large number of Medicare patients, they may 
also receive a significant percentage of their incomes from those 
patients. In the event of a large-scale audit that resulted in 
recoupment of substantial funds under appeal, the provider’s 
remaining income may not be sufficient to compensate for the lost 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. Westlaw Headnote 1, Constitutional Law, has over 1200 references. 
 201. Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Bi-Metallic Inv. v. State B. of 
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
 202. McBride, supra note 2. 
 203. Recovery Audit Contractors, supra note 20. 
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Medicare funds, and as a result, those providers would have no 
choice but to close their doors. Had the appeals process occurred in 
the statutorily designated timeframe of ninety days, the burden on 
the provider would be much lighter, as the appeal would be decided 
within a reasonable amount of time. Even if Medicare recoups all of 
the money in dispute by the end of the ALJ ruling, as long as the 
process occurs within the limited timeframe, it is less likely to have 
such a harsh effect in the event the appeals are overturned. 
1. Timeliness as a Due Process requirement 
Even absent recognition that a provider’s opportunity to practice 
within his occupation constitutes a liberty right for due process 
purposes, agency adjudicatory timeliness has been presented as a due 
process requirement.204 In the Supreme Court case Barry v. Barchi, a 
horse trainer’s license was revoked without a hearing after his horse 
tested positive for drugs.205 The applicable state law allowed this 
practice, but also required a post-suspension hearing to determine 
the trainer’s culpability, if any.206 The Court conceded that the initial 
suspension was allowable.207 Although the statute called for an 
eventual hearing, the Court took issue with the absence of a 
timeframe for the hearing to be held.208 The suspension must be 
followed by a “prompt judicial or administrative hearing that would 
definitely determine the issues . . . .”209 Additionally, language used 
in previous cases called for the trainer to be heard “at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner.”210 Because of the lack of any 
timeframe in Barry, a trainer’s suspension could be over before a 
hearing was even held, causing the trainer to suffer the full penalty 
before having a chance to be heard and present his evidence.211 The 
Court concluded that the lack of a timely hearing requirement in the 
statute, on its face and as applied in this case, resulted in a denial of 
the trainer’s due process.212 
 
 204. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979). 
 205. Id. at 59 
 206. Id. at 59–60. 
 207. Id. at 63. 
 208. Id. at 64. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 66 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
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Several other cases involving agency timeliness followed Barry, 
with parallel results.213 In one such case, Martell v. Mauzy, a 
landfill owner was denied a continuing permit without any 
hearing on the allegations that constituted the denial.214 The 
owner had an opportunity to have the decision reviewed, but the 
review could extend as long as 120 days.215 The court determined 
that the time allotted for review coupled with the deprivation of 
the permit could damage the livelihood of the owner.216 The court 
stated, “The post-denial review procedures set out . . . are 
constitutionally inadequate in this case in that they fail to provide 
for a prompt post-denial hearing and disposition.”217 The landfill 
would likely be bankrupt and out of business by the time the 
agency was required to issue a decision.218 
As the concepts in these cases are applied to the current state of 
RAC appeals that are backlogged for years, it suggests that CMS’s 
lack of timeliness is a due process violation. Any provider who has 
experienced recoupment of funds before the ALJ hearing is 
comparable to the trainer in Barry, whose license was revoked prior 
to a hearing. But the Court did not take issue, per se, with the 
imposition of a penalty before a hearing. The problem with the 
procedure in Barry is identical to the problem with the procedure in 
RAC appeals—there is no method by which to compel the hearing 
within a reasonable time. In Barry, this was the situation because the 
statute did not call for any time period by which the hearing should 
be held. But that was not the only problem. The Court was not 
solely concerned with the lack of a timetable. The Court also found 
the lack of a timely hearing significant, as applied in that particular 
instance, indicating that the procedure actually in use is just as 
important as the words in the statute. 
In the case of RAC appeals, there is a clear timetable set forth 
within the statute, eliminating the need for a facial analysis. But 
courts consider how the regulation is applied as well. The full stop 
 
 213. See Martell v. Mauzy, 511 F. Supp. 729, 742 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Gleichman v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Argic., 896 F. Supp. 42 (D. Me. 1995); Gershenfeld v. Justices of the Supreme Court 
of Pa., 641 F. Supp. 1419 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Lasmer Indus., Inc. v. Def. Supply Ctr. Columbus, 
2:08-CV-0286, 2008 WL 2457704 (S.D. Ohio 2008). 
 214. Martell, 511 F. Supp. at 731. 
 215. Id. at 740–1. 
 216. Id. at 740. 
 217. Id. at 742. 
 218. Id. 
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that has been implemented within the appeals process violates the 
portion of the statute that calls for timeliness, thereby creating the 
same situation that the Court addressed in Barry. 
Barry also conveyed the importance of a hearing “at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”219 Were a hearing to 
take place within the statutorily designated time, a court would 
likely find that “meaningful.” When the statutory limit is being 
exceeded by nearly ten times, any court would be hard pressed to 
make the determination that the timing was even reasonable, let 
alone meaningful. 
The liberty right in Martell mirrors that of providers facing 
recoupment within RAC appeals. When the court analyzed the 
review process, it found that the business owner could well be out of 
business before the agency issued its determination.220 In this 
instance, 120 days was too long for the business to be losing its 
source of income before review.221 Considering RAC appeals are 
currently at twenty-eight months222—approximately 840 days— it 
would be difficult for CMS to argue that such a long delay does not 
deprive providers of their due process rights. 
2. What process is due? 
The test put forth in Mathews v. Eldridge has become the 
standard for determining what process is due within an agency.223 
The strength of each of these factors must be balanced against the 
others to conclude the proper process. 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.224 
 
 219. Barry, 443 U.S. at 66. 
 220. Martell, 511 F. Supp. at 740. 
 221.  Id. at 740–41. 
 222. Adjudication Timeframes, supra note 146. 
 223. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 224. Id. 
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The court in Martell spent considerable time analyzing the three 
factors set forth in Mathews.225 The private interest was the landfill, 
and the official action was the permit denial.226 Without review, the 
owner had no opportunity for a reversal of the denial, and the 
business would quickly have had to close its doors.227 The weight of 
this factor was abundant in the eyes of the court, considering 
significant damage to the business had already been done.228 The 
second factor was the assessment of the risk of erroneous deprivation 
of the stated interest.229 The Martell court pointed to the lack of 
credibility of the information used as a basis for the denial, and 
concluded that the risk was “great.”230 The state’s interest in the 
proceedings, the third factor, was also important.231 The government 
had a responsibility to protect the public health, a major factor in the 
licensure of landfills.232 The court also weighed the burden that 
would be placed on the agency if the matter were to be resolved 
differently.233 The court did not find any appreciable, additional 
burden, either financial or administrative, if the agency were to 
provide a hearing prior to the denial of the permit.234 Although the 
state’s interests in this case bore some weight, the procedures 
employed “poorly served” those interests.235 The procedures left 
open the risk that a private interest could be erroneously deprived, 
and the court found a “minimal” burden on the agency to 
accommodate further proceedings.236 The agency was required to 
hold a hearing to satisfy the business owner’s due process.237 
When determining what process is due in a RAC appeal, the first 
factor requires recognizing the private interest involved and 
determining its relative weight. In this analysis, the private interest is 
the occupation and sustainment of the provider’s business. The risk 
 
 225. Martell, 511 F. Supp. at 740–42. 
 226. Id. at 740. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 741. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
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 233. Id. at 742. 
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 237. Id. at 744. 
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that a business could be required to close its doors because of 
premature recoupment is a substantial interest. The Supreme Court 
has found this interest to weigh heavily in the analysis towards 
requiring more process before agency action is taken.238 The current 
substantial delays within OMHA show that although more process is 
essential, the agency has no ability to provide it. 
The risk of erroneous deprivation of the identified liberty also 
bears consideration. A high percentage of Medicare denials are 
overturned at the ALJ level, suggesting a great risk that dollars in 
dispute are wrongly recouped from providers. Because the damage 
has the potential to be devastating, this erroneous deprivation has 
the potential to cause irreparable harm to the provider. 
The final consideration analyzes the agency’s interest in limiting 
the procedures to those already in place. CMS has an obvious 
financial interest in keeping the status quo. Not only is the agency 
recouping dollars, some of which it may or may not actually have a 
claim to, but CMS is additionally not putting forth more money to 
either speed up the proceedings or offer alternatives to providers. 
There would be little harm, if any, to CMS if the recoupment began 
later in the process, for example, after the ALJ determination. The 
providers that were billing before an ALJ hearing, enabling 
recoupment, would presumably still be billing after the hearing, still 
allowing CMS to recover the funds at a later date. 
The factors within RAC appeals appear to be weighted similarly 
to the factors in Martell. In Martell, the court found that the agency 
would not be burdened by affording the business owner additional 
process, especially when the agency’s burden was weighed against 
the liberty right of the owner and the chance for the right to be 
deprived in error. The occupational right of a RAC provider is 
indistinguishable from the same right in Martell. The result from 
deprivation of that right is identical in the two instances—a business 
risks closing its doors. The burden to CMS is light in comparison to 
the rights of the business, which should bring any court to the same 
conclusion as Martell. Therefore, CMS should be implementing 
additional procedures to ensure due process to every provider. In 
this case, CMS would likely need to, at the very least, delay 
recoupment until providers are given an adequate hearing. 
 
 238. Id. at 740. 
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B. Additional Factors that Weigh on Due Process 
1. Time as a weapon 
A further theory on timeliness has been raised by Joe Sims and 
Michael McFalls: “[Agencies] are more than willing to extract 
additional relief by leveraging the fact that time is the enemy of all 
transactions, thus obtaining relief in many cases that would never 
have been awarded in a litigated decree.”239 
The theory posited here is not unfathomable. CMS is fully aware 
of the financial predicament that providers confront when a large 
portion of their revenue faces the possibility of termination. The 
agency has nothing to lose by dragging the proceedings on for years. 
Many providers may be willing to settle claims for a smaller amount 
than initially demanded out of a fear of losing their entire business as 
an alternative, even when they believe the denials were made in 
error. But that alternative is only recognizable because of the 
enormous delays within the agency, making any settlement 
proceedings biased against the provider from their inception. 
Although there is no evidence that CMS is intentionally 
prolonging the appeals process, there seems to be little effort to 
mitigate the immense time a provider must wait for its appeal to be 
adjudicated. Since timeliness is a requirement of due process, it 
would be reasonable to require the agency to at least attempt to 
alleviate the delays providers face. 
2. Escalation as a solution 
It could be argued that a provider has the option of avoiding the 
lengthy wait for an ALJ hearing. Since the statutory timeliness 
requirement for the appeal is not being met, the provider may 
proceed to the next level of appeal, thereby alleviating the due 
process violation. Unfortunately, problems remain with that option 
as well. 
As of February, 2014, backlog of appeals was numbered at 
480,000.240 If even a small percentage of affected providers exercised 
the option to move on to the Appeals Council, the appeal level after 
the ALJ, the problem plaguing the ALJ would merely shift to the 
 
 239. Joe Sims & Michael McFalls, Negotiated Merger Remedies: How Well Do They Solve 
Competition Problems?, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 932, 944 (2001). 
 240. Medicare Appellant Forum, supra note 152. 
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Appeals Council. The Appeals Council is not a large entity, 
adjudicating just under 2,600 appeals during 2013 with 76 
employees.241 A greater number of reviews before the Appeals 
Council would delay the process at that level as well. Furthermore, 
the Appeals Council is not required, although it is allowed by 
statute, to hold an actual hearing on appeal.242 This may serve as a 
deterrent to providers looking for a hearing. If there is a chance that 
the Appeals Council will rule without a hearing, which would just be 
a repetition of the earlier process, a provider might not want to risk 
skipping the only step where it will have the opportunity to present, 
question, and cross-examine witnesses. 
Additionally, there are three important reasons for not bypassing 
the ALJ hearing. First, the hearing is the only step in the process that 
produces a record and affords the provider the opportunity to 
present and cross-examine witnesses.243 It is also the only formal 
proceeding in the process in which the ALJ issues a written 
decision.244 The hearing creates a record that decision-makers in the 
subsequent stages of appeal can reference when reviewing the case; 
the ALJ hearing is the only step to do so before an appeal reaches 
the federal district court.245 
Secondly, the ALJ presiding over the hearing is the first 
uninterested party to do so in the process, since the ALJ is part of 
OMHA, a separate entity from CMS.246 The QIC in the appeal step 
below and the Appeals Council in the step above are part of CMS 
and HHS, respectively, and the initial redetermination is made by an 
employee of the RAC. 
Finally, the bulk of Medicare appeals that come before an ALJ 
are overturned.247 Providers are able to collect the funds that have 
 
 241. Rich Marotti, A Report and Analysis on the OMHA Medicare Appellant Forum and 
the Suspension of ALJ Hearings for Medicare Providers, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (April 
2014), www.americanbar.org/publications/aba_health_esource/2013-14/april/ 
omha_medicare.html. 
 242. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1108 (2011). 
 243. Your ALJ Hearing, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/omha/Coverage%20and% 
20Claims%20Appeals/Your%20ALJ%20Hearing/hearing.html; Mariotti, supra note 241. 
 244. Medicare Appeals Process, MEDICARE CMS.GOV, 9 (Aug. 2014), 
http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-
MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/MedicareAppealsProcess.pdf. 
 245. Marotti, supra note 241. 
 246. Id. 
 247. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 95, at 3. 
SQUIRE.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:12 PM 
219 RAC: A Program in Distress 
 249 
been recouped once the ALJ determines the denial was in error, 
presumably making many providers willing to wait a little longer to 
ensure the availability of this step. 
3. Burdens of judicial review 
If the Appeals Council appeal is not performed in a timely 
manner, providers have the chance to bypass this step.248 Providers 
may escalate the dispute to the courts, starting in the federal district 
court.249 Although this action may satisfy due process, it imposes 
additional burdens on the providers. 
Time is a fairly obvious burden on the provider during the 
appeals process. Clearly, time is not a friend to a provider who is 
being forced to fight with CMS over money he earned during the 
treatment of a Medicare patient. Once the money has been recouped 
by CMS, the provider must make do without those funds. In certain 
cases, a provider may have to close his doors. On the other side, 
CMS is not burdened at all by the delays. CMS is in possession of 
the money, and there are no penalties imposed for its failure to act. 
Even absent any nefarious intent on CMS’s part, the process is still 
unfairly tilted in favor of CMS. 
Financial hardship is another genuine burden on providers 
waiting for their day to be heard. Each step in the appeals process 
requires the provider to submit additional forms and information, 
provide notice to all parties to the proceeding, and prepare for any 
witnesses, cross-examinations, or testimony to be provided. Most 
providers retain counsel, especially at the ALJ level, and this, of 
course, costs money. By the time the claim enters federal court, 
there will inevitably be attorneys involved, and court preparation 
usually comes at financial expense. Also, any monies in dispute have 
been or are in the process of being recouped by this point, denying 
the provider access to that money as well. Although CMS also 
requires the preparation for a court proceeding as the provider, 
those costs are small in comparison to its budget, whereas a 
provider’s costs are greater in proportion. Again, the bulk of the 
burden is solely on the provider. 
 
 248. The Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 28, at 7. 
 249. Id. at 7–8. 
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4. Exhaustion and finality 
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)250 is the default 
governing statute for agencies. Although the APA grants judicial 
review of agency decisions, it does impose some restrictions on 
what matters may reach a courtroom,251 which could also hinder 
due process during escalation. 
Section 704 of the APA calls for judicial review of “final agency 
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a 
court . . . .”252 The concept of exhaustion is a product of common 
law, and the Supreme Court explained the requirement in 
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank 
of Johnson City.253 The two doctrines of finality and exhaustion are 
often intertwined, yet the Court clarifies that they are separate and 
discrete requirements:254 
The question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted 
is conceptually distinct, however, from the question whether an 
administrative action must be final before it is judicially 
reviewable. While the policies underlying the two concepts often 
overlap, the finality requirement is concerned with whether the 
initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the 
issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion 
requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial 
procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an 
adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to 
be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate.255 
The absence of either of these requirements may be fatal flaws in 
cases that are escalated to federal court. 
In McCarthy v. Madigan, the Court discusses important policy 
reasons for these doctrines.256 First, it acknowledges that Congress 
has granted the agency authority to administer its own programs.257 
The agency should provide the primary body to right any wrong 
 
 250. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
 251. Id. at § 704. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172, 192–93 (1985). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. (citations omitted). 
 256. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992). 
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within the program before being “haled into federal court.”258 
Judicial efficiency is also served when an agency can solve its own 
problems because problems are worked out more cohesively, not in a 
“piecemeal” manner.259 Lastly, the court found exhausting that the 
administrative avenues created a record that a judge could refer to in 
rendering his decision, notably in matters where the agency has 
significant expertise;260 conversely, the absence of a record from prior 
proceedings provides nothing for a court to review. 
Exhaustion of a RAC audit appeal requires the provider to work 
his way through the entire appeals process that CMS provides 
before escalating the matter to federal district court. If the provider 
has escalated the claim as a result of agency inaction, it would 
appear that he has technically exhausted all channels of agency 
review. The possibility remains that a federal judge could see the 
matter differently. She could disallow this type of appeal altogether, 
sending it back to the agency and further prolonging the process. 
One reason a judge may make that type of decision is that without 
the two-skipped appeals in the record, most notably the ALJ 
hearing and decision, the judge has little to draw from when 
analyzing the appeal. 
There are three exceptions to the exhaustion requirement: undue 
prejudice, futility, and lack of effective relief.261 The undue prejudice 
exception could apply to this type of case. A court may waive the 
exhaustion requirement if it determines that requiring the provider 
to continue the process with CMS would unduly prejudice the 
provider’s rights. One example of undue prejudice that the Court 
has specifically mentioned is “unreasonable or indefinite timeframe 
for administrative action.”262 That exception may well apply, since 
CMS has written adjudication timelines, but they are routinely not 
being met at the ALJ level. Those delays are in essence voiding the 
timeframes, leaving the providers without adequate remedy. 
Even if a court were to exempt exhaustion, finality could also 
prove fatal to a provider’s case in court. Finality in this instance 
would entail an ultimate conclusion from CMS that the provider 
had, in error, received the Medicare funds. If a provider were to 
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escalate from the QIC all the way to the federal district court, he 
would bypass the final level of agency review, which seems to be 
the entity that would issue a final order. Without an order from 
the Appeals Council, a judge reviewing the case may kick it back 
to the agency for a final conclusion in order to satisfy the doctrine 
of finality. 
VI. SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS TO THE RAC PROGRAM 
Bills were introduced in Congress in 2012 and 2013 that 
would have imposed fines on RACs for overturned denials, 
further limited ADR requests, required CMS to publish RAC 
statistics, and addressed hospital rebilling issues.263 Although they 
contained provisions that would have been a good step in 
improving the RAC program, neither bill made any headway, 
never making it out of committee.264 
In order to reduce the backlog of cases, CMS will need to 
devise some new strategies for expeditiously processing RAC 
appeals and making the process fairer to providers who are in limbo 
awaiting a final adjudication. CMS could alter the audit process, 
thereby reducing the number of claims that would be denied. 
Another set of options arises in the appeals phase. By facilitating an 
appeals process that finalizes more claims earlier, both the 
government and the provider will benefit through reduced 
adjudicatory costs and more satisfaction with the procedure. 
A. Proposed Audit Changes 
1. Increase ADR minimums 
Increasing minimum ADRs forces the RAC to uncover more 
possible errors before it burdens the provider with a request for 
production. This will delay the requests until there is a more 
substantial basis for assuming error. It could also eliminate the 
requests for some providers altogether, if the audit does not 
uncover the threshold amount. The new rules issued and enacted 
in December 2014 improve the state of ADRs, as the maximums 
 
 263. Medicare Audit Improvement Act of 2012, H.R. 6575, 112th Cong. (2012); 
Medicare Audit Improvement Act of 2013, H.R. 1250, 113th Cong. (2013). 
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were addressed,265 but problems still remain with a lower 
threshold minimum. 
2. Shorten the look-back period for all types of claims 
A shortened look-back period would immediately reduce the 
number of claims denied by the RACs because it would shrink the 
number of claims they had the ability to review. CMS has already 
addressed the unfair look-back period for hospital patient status 
claims, but a further reduction in the overall look-back allowance for 
RACs would relieve some of the pressure on the appeals process and 
allow the current appeals to begin to filter through without adding 
more at the same or higher rate. 
B. Proposed Appeals Changes 
1. Delay recoupment 
Recoupment begins upon the issuance of an affirming opinion at 
the QIC.266 During the current backlog of twenty-eight months that 
a provider must wait for its appeal to be heard by an ALJ,267 the next 
appeal level, Medicare begins recoupment of funds.268 Since the ALJs 
are not fulfilling their statutory obligation of hearing the cases within 
60 days of filing, and a high number of appeals are overturned at this 
point, CMS should postpone the initiation of recoupment until 
completion of the ALJ determination.269 This delay would allow for 
providers’ businesses to continue operating in a healthy financial 
manner, while the delayed appeals process continues. 
2. Delay RAC fee payment 
Under the current system, RACs have an incentive to not only 
deny as many claims as possible at the audit stage, but they have an 
increased incentive to deny any and all redeterminations. No 
evidence exists that RACs have put this theory into practice; but 
there is, nonetheless, a concerning percentage of claims that are 
overturned at higher appeal levels outside of the RAC itself. 
 
 265. Recovery Audit Program Improvements, supra note 165. 
 266. The Medicare Overpayment Collection Process, supra note 10, at 3. 
 267. Adjudication Timeframes, supra note 146. 
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Currently, as long as a denial survives that second level of appeal, the 
RAC collects the fee upon recoupment.270 Delaying payment until 
after the QIC is a small step in the right direction, but the RACs may 
take the penalty more seriously if they have to wait the same length 
of time as the providers. 
Despite possible repayment, it is still in the interest of the RAC 
to collect as much money as it can as soon as possible. Not only can 
the RAC collect interest from its collected fees, including those in 
dispute, but the longer the appeals process goes on, the more likely 
it is that the provider will give up on the appeal or miss a deadline, 
thereby invalidating the appeal and guaranteeing the RAC its fee. 
Since a majority of appeals that reach the ALJ are overturned, the 
RAC should not be paid its fee on a claim until the appeal survives a 
hearing at the third level. 
3. Auditor penalties271 
The current penalty structure continues to create perverse 
incentives for the RACs. Not only are RACs incentivized to review 
and deny as many claims as possible, but they are also incentivized to 
deny redeterminations. The recent CMS improvements punish a 
RAC with ten percent or higher overturns at the first level of appeal, 
which is conducted by employees of the RAC. It would seem the 
incentive is now greater to ensure claims are not overturned at this 
level to avoid the financial penalty. The solution to this continued 
problem lies in penalties levied against the RAC for high percentages 
of overturn at appeal levels out of the RAC’s control. This 
incentivizes the RAC to “get it right” at the redetermination. 
4. Pre-Appeal Mediation 
Mediation is not a component of the present RAC program until 
the appeals process. Allowing for mediation prior to an appeal could 
alleviate a lot of the stress on the current appeals system. If the 
parties are comfortable compromising, it would be wise to allow 
them to take this step prior to an appeal. 
 
 270. See Recovery Audit Program Improvements, supra note 165. 
 271. Medicare Audit Improvement Act of 2012, H.R. 6575, 112th Cong. (2012); 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
It seems clear that the RAC program is broken in the largest of 
ways. Not only are the processes used questioned by those targeted 
as well as by public officials, but the procedure to handle 
adjudication is also not efficiently disposing of the cases. As the 
backlog grew, the auditors continued to send more and more 
denials. Now CMS is in a precarious position that it seems nearly 
impossible to remedy absent a complete halt to the program while 
the appeals system has a chance to catch up. 
That is not to say that the RAC program does not have 
supporters. Taxpayer groups recognize the amount of money that 
RAC audits have returned to Medicare, and seem to oppose any 
limitation placed on the auditors.272 This view holds some validity, as 
the program does recover legitimate funds. But the cost at which 
those funds come is too high. A program that so heavily burdens 
those entrusted to provide medical care to the elderly, especially 
when facing due process violations, cannot be allowed to continue. 
Looking at the situation in its totality, it seems clear on several 
fronts that providers’ due process rights stand a considerable chance 
of being violated. If the harms were isolated, they would be easier to 
justify. But when there are possible violations regarding occupational 
rights and timeliness rights, as well as questionable methods and 
incentives for denial of claims, topped off with CMS’s inability to 
handle its own adjudication process, it appears that the best solution 
could range from instituting a major overhaul to cancelling the 
whole program and starting from scratch. 
Because of the complexity and severity of the state of RAC audits 
and appeals today, none of the suggested improvements will solve 
the current problems. Permanent solutions will require overhauls not 
only of the audit procedure, but of the appeals process as well. The 
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circumstances that lead to the possible violation of provider due 
process must end, regardless of whether the program is eliminated or 
is revamped to remove and remedy the circumstances that have 
undermined the program. 
CMS has created a situation where its own actions could lead to 
a constitutional intrusion on the rights of the providers who care for 
its beneficiaries. Unfortunately, this situation is dire and in need of 
immediate attention. Coupled with the desperation of providers for 
more fair and timely resolutions to appeals, CMS must acknowledge 
and fix the imperfections in the system that brought it to a standstill. 
 
Mary Squire 
